Academic CentreEXTENDED GLOSSARY OF VIRTUE ETHICS
Adikía (adicia; Gr. ἀδικία, ΑΔΙΚΙΑ. Noun.) – injustice. Cf. Ádikos.
Ǽlæos (eleos; Gr. ἔλεος, ΕΛΕΟΣ. Noun.) – empathy, compassion. Compassion is the most important virtue because it is in harmony with the providence of Zeus (Ζεύς) himself, who has sent his son Diónysos (Διόνυσος) to free us from the sorrowful circle of births (κύκλος γενέσεως). This plan of Zeus directly results from his own empathy for creation. You cannot develop genuine compassion if you are unable to feel other sentient beings. It is impossible to feel others unless the false barricade of ego drops. As ego collapses, the soul begins to feel others and naturally develops empathy. The ethical virtues are generated effortlessly from the empathetic soul.
Æpieikeia (epikeia or epiceia; Gr. ἐπιείκεια, ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΑ. Noun. Pronounced: eh-pee-EE-kee-ah) – fairness, reasonableness. Æpieikeia is equity and is included in the discussion of Justice. Equity, in this case, is reason as applied to justice such that the strictness of law is weighed against circumstances. Ἀριστοτέλης in Ηθικών Νικομαχείων 1137 a 32 speaks of equity overriding the letter of the law when justice demands it.
Æpistími (episteme; Gr. ἐπιστήμη, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Noun.) – scientific knowledge, one of five intellectual virtues required to make choices. See Intellectual Virtues, The Five.
Ǽrgon (ergon; Gr. ἔργον, ΕΡΓΟΝ. Noun.) – function, work. Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης) argues that the ǽrgon, the function or work, which most exemplifies the human animal is reason. This ǽrgon, if used properly and developed, enables us to be fully human, to live appropriately as a human being; to do so is to develop the virtue or excellence of rationality, which is inherent in our nature.
Ainarǽtis (aenaretes; Gr. αἰναρέτης, ΑΙΝΑΡΕΤΗΣ. Noun. Etym. αἰνὸς “terrible” + ἀρετή) – great bravery.
Alitrós (alitrus; Gr. ἀλιτρός, ΑΛΙΤΡΟΣ. Adjective.) – wicked, vicious.
Andreia (Gr. ἀνδρεία, ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑ. Noun.) – manliness, courage, one of the Four Cardinal Virtues. Cf. Thrásos.
Andipæponthós (antipeponthus; Gr. ἀντιπεπονθός, ΑΝΤΙΠΕΠΟΝΘΟΣ. Participle.) – reciprocity in a legal sense and is a subject of justice, as discussed in Ἀριστοτέλης Ηθικών Νικομαχείων 5.5 1132 b 22.
Apátheia (Gr. ἀπάθεια, ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ. Noun. Etym. α "not"; + πάθος "passion") – apathy, freedom from emotion and the passions. Apátheia was regarded by the Stoics as a virtue. Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης) does not talk of apátheia in respect to virtue because he accepts the passions as essential to the human experience, seeing the ideal as a mean between extremes of passion.
Arætí (arete; Gr. ἀρετή, ΑΡΕΤΗ. Noun.) – virtue, excellence esp. ethical virtue, sometimes bravery.
Arætiphóros (aretephorus; Gr. ἀρετηφόρος, ΑΡΕΤΗΦΟΡΟΣ. Adjective.) – virtuous.
Arætóömai (aretoömae; Gr. ἀρετόομαι, ΑΡΕΤΟΟΜΑΙ. Verb.) – to progress, to grow in virtue.
Aretaic ethics = Virtue Ethics (Etym. ἀρετή "goodness, excellence") – Aretaic ethics is the philosophical view which contends that virtuous behavior flows naturally from a person of strong character, and thus attempts to develop means in which to help individuals develop an excellent character. The roots of aretaic ethics lie in ancient Greek philosophy, in particular, from the teachings of Sohkrátis (Σωκράτης), Plátohn (Πλάτων), and Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης).
Arete – see Arætí.
Aretephorus – see Arætiphóros.
Aretoömai – see Arætóömai.
Aristeia (Gr. ἀριστεία, ΑΡΙΣΤΕΙΑ. Noun.) – excellence, synonym for arætí or virtue. Cf. Arætí.
Athiná – (Athena; Gr. Ἀθηνᾶ, ΑΘΗΝΑ) – Athiná is dǽspina, the queen who is Virtue itself. Orphic frag. 175: Ἀρετῆς τ&' ὄνομ'; ἐσθλὸν κλήιζεται "She (ed. Athiná) is celebrated by the good name of Virtue" (translated by the author).
Chrestoëtheia – see Khristöítheia.
Chrestotes – see Khristótis.
Compassion – empathy. See Ǽlæos.
Courage – see Andreia and Thrásos.
Dǽspina (Despoina; Gr. Δέσποινα, ΔΕΣΠΟΙΝΑ. Noun.) – literally mistress or queen. Virtue is personified with the name Dǽspina.
Dikaiosýni (dicaeosyne; Gr. δικαιοσύνη, ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ. Noun. Also δίκη "justice") – righteousness, justice. Dikaiosýni is one of the Four Cardinal Virtues. Plátohn (Πλάτων), in Politeia (The Republic; Gr. Πολιτεία), compares the justice of the individual to the justice of the pólis (city-state; Gr. πόλις). He describes a pólis divided into three parts, the productive populace, the guardians, and the ruler. When all three do their proper job, the pólis is in harmony and in a state of justice. Likewise, in the individual, when the three parts of the soul, the appetite, the spirit, and the mind, have the accompanying virtues of temperance, courage, and wisdom, the same virtues required for the three parts of the pólis, then the soul is in harmony and is just. This view of justice being one of several presented in the dialogue.
Eleos – see Ǽlæos.
Epieikeia – see Æpieikeia.
Epikeia – see Æpieikeia.
Episteme – see Æpistími.
Equity – see Æpieikeia.
Ergon – see Ǽrgon.
Eudaimonia – see Evdaimonía.
Evdaimonía (eudaimonia; Gr. εὐδαιμονία, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ. Noun. Etym. εὖ "kindly" + δαίμων "spirit" or "divinity") – happiness, flourishing. Evdaimonía is included in a discussion of virtue because many philosophers contend that true happiness cannot be acquired without virtue. If the teleology of the acquisition of virtue is evdaimonía, and if the acquisition of virtue is what is most desired for us by the Gods, then it follows that the Blessed Gods desire our lives to flourish and for us to be happy.
Friendship – see Philótis.
Intellectual Virtues, The Five – According to Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης), there are three aspects of the soul which determine action: sensation, intellect, and desire. Sensation is based on mere reaction to stimuli, and, hence, does not originate action, according to this philosopher. Therefore, to make choices depends on intellect and desire. To achieve a virtuous result requires inclination of the mind as regards to choice, choice being deliberate desire (ὄρεξις), and that choice (προαίρεσις) must be based on knowledge, action which requires reason. Here we are speaking of the achievement of truth in regard to our action, this being a practical application of the intellect. Aristotǽlis proposes [Ηθικών Νικομαχείων VI.3-7] that there are five intellectual virtues which determine this process. (See also the individual entries for each virtue):
- Æpistími (episteme; Gr. ἐπιστήμη) – scientific knowledge, acquaintance.
- Tǽkhni (techne; Gr. τέχνη) – applied knowledge, method, craft.
- Phrónisis (phronesis; Gr. φρόνησις) – practical wisdom, prudence.
- Nous (Gr. νοῦς) – mind in the sense of reason, intellect.
- Sophía (Gr. σοφία) – speculative or higher wisdom.
Jurisprudence (Etym. Latin juris "body of law" + prudentia "knowledge" or "sagacity.") – the theory or philosophy of law and concern of Dikaiosýni, Justice.
Justice – see Dikaiosýni.
Khristöítheia (chrestoëtheia; Gr. χρηστοήθεια, ΧΡΗΣΤΟΗΘΕΙΑ. Noun.) – goodness of heart.
Khristótis (chrestotes; Gr. χρηστότης, ΧΡΗΣΤΟΤΗΣ. Noun.) – good character.
Mægalopsykhía (megalopsychia; Gr. μεγαλοψυχία, ΜΕΓΑΛΟΨΥΧΙΑ. Noun.) – magnanimity. Mægalopsykhía is one of the virtues. It is often translated by the word pride, but certainly not in the sense of a vice. Its correct definition is contained in the etymology of the word: μεγαλο "great" + ψυχία "soulness". Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης) defines mægalopsykhía as a mid-point between vanity and timidity, so the pride which comes with this virtue is based on an honest assessment of one's merits. Mægalopsykhía is magnanimity and has an aristocratic sense in that he who possesses it also possesses a wealth of virtue and the material means to be generous within the boundary of proper moderation.
Mǽson, to – see Mæsótis.
Mæsótis (mesotes; Gr. μεσότης, ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ. Noun. Also τό μέσον.) – the mean, the middle point. Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης) defines virtue as a mean, the mæsótis, between two opposites. It could be said that the mæsótis is expressed in the famous Delphic maxim, μηδὲν ἄγαν, "nothing to excess".
Mean, the – see Mæsótis.
Meson, to – see Mæsótis.
Mesotes – see Mæsótis.
Natural Law – philosophical position that there are rights and values which are inherent in the Kózmos (Κόσμος), that they can be discerned by reason, that these rights and values are not artificial constructions, and that they supersede human laws. Natural law should not be confused with The Natural Laws, the fundamental laws which govern the universe, although there is a connection between them.
Normative Ethics – philosophical study of virtuous or ethical action, how, from a moral perspective, one should proceed when confronted with the situations one encounters in life. There are various approaches which have developed which address ethical action: Aretaic or Virtue Ethics (moral character), Consequentialism (teleology), Deontology (duty), and various others, each of these categories also having variants.
Nous (Gr. νοῦς, ΝΟΥΣ. Noun.) – mind, intuition, an intelligence which enables us to examine our experience, draw conclusions, and make successful decisions concerning our action. Nous is, according to Aristotǽlis, one of five intellectual virtues required in order to make good choices. See Intellectual Virtues, The Four.
Óræxis (orexis; Gr. ὄρεξις, ΟΡΕΞΙΣ. Noun.) – desire. Aristotǽlis (Περὶ Ψυχῆς [De Anima] 431–433) portrays óræxis as a function of the soul, the capacity to pursue an object of desire; it is that which pushes the soul into motion. He discerns three forms of óræxis: passion (θυμός), intention or wishing (βούλησις), and yearning (ἐπιθυμία).
Osiótis (Gr. ὁσιότης, ΟΣΙΟΤΗΣ) – piety, reverence to the Gods, deference to divine law, listed as a fifth cardinal virtue in Πλάτων Πρωταγόρας 330b.
Páthos (Gr. πάθος, ΠΑΘΟΣ. Noun. Plural is πάθη.) – passion. Passion is regarded as a passive state; in other words, passion is something which comes upon you, independent of your will.
Philótis (philotes; Gr. φιλότης, ΦΙΛΟΤΗΣ. Noun.) – friendship. Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης), in Ηθικών Νικομαχείων Book 8, discusses friendship in great detail. He identifies three types:
- friendship based on utility,
- friendship based on mutual pleasure,
- perfect friendship, the highest form and a great virtue, being a partnership between two people which fosters the highest character development.
Phronesis – see Phrónisis.
Phrónisis (Phronesis; Gr. φρόνησις, ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ. Noun.) – one of the Four Cardinal Virtues is Wisdom, consisting of two parts: phrónisis, practical wisdom, and sophía (σοφία), elevated wisdom. Phrónisis is often translated with the word prudence, a practical wisdom which enables us to order our lives in an excellent way. Phrónisis, according to Aristotǽlis, is one of five intellectual virtues required in order to make good choices. See also Virtues, The Four Cardinal and Intellectual Virtues, The Five.
Proairæsis (proaeresis or prohaeresis; Gr. προαίρεσις, ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ. Noun.) – conscious choice, the volition of choice, deliberative desire (ὄρεξις). Proairæsis is a term, in the field of ethics, which indicates deliberate choice which, in certain circumstances, determines whether an action (πρᾶξις) is moral or immoral (or neutral). Proairæsis is the result of deliberation (βούλευσις). In the Stoicism of Æpíktitos (Ἐπίκτητος), proairæsis is the result of a deliberation between what is perceived to be within one's power to change or effect, and that which is not in one's power to change or effect, and assenting only to the former by which only can one make a free choice.
Reciprocity – see Antipæponthós, to.
Sohphrosýni (Sophrosyne; Gr. σωφροσύνη, ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ. Noun.) – generally, common sense, but often: moderation, self-discipline, or temperance based upon thorough self-examination. Sohphrosýni is one of the Four Cardinal Virtues of classical antiquity. The word and its meanings are discussed in Kharmídis (Χαρμίδης), a dialogue of Plátohn (Πλάτων), but in the text, Sohkrátis (Σωκράτης) rejects four definitions: quietness, humility, doing one's own business, and knowing one's self. Although there is no final resolution to the dialogue, it seems that each of
these proposed definitions has some application to the topic, in particular the final one. Aristotǽlis describes sohphrosýni as a virtue concerned with one's relationship to pleasure, particularly in regard to the sense of touch; sohphrosýni is the mean between licentiousness and insensitivity.
Sophía (Gr. Σοφία, ΣΟΦΙΑ. Noun.) – one of the Four Cardinal Virtues is called Wisdom; it consists of two parts: phrónisis, practical wisdom or prudence, and sophía, elevated wisdom. Sophía or theory, according to Aristotǽlis, is the most noble wisdom which gives us the ability to integrate all of our knowledge and to gain insight into the deepest truth. Sophía is one of five intellectual virtues which enable us to make good choices. See Intellectual Virtues, The Five.
Sophrosyne – see Sohphrosýni.
Tǽkhni (techne; Gr. τέχνη, ΤΕΧΝΙ. Noun.) – art, applied knowledge, the creative ability. Tǽkhni, according to Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης), is one of the five intellectual virtues required to make good choices. See Intellectual Virtues, The Five.
Tǽlos (telos; Gr. τέλος, ΤΕΛΟΣ. Noun.) – the end or purpose of action, consummation, or final cause. Tǽlos is the etymological root of teleology, the understanding of things by means of their ultimate function or goal. Aristotǽlis (Ἀριστοτέλης) argues that the ultimate tǽlos for human beings is evdaimonía, true happiness, and that true happiness can only be obtained by living a virtuous life.
Techne – see Tǽkhni.
Telos – see Tǽlos.
Temperance – see Sohphrosýni.
Thrásos (Gr. θράσος, ΘΡΑΣΟΣ. Noun.) – manliness or courage. Thrásos or Courage is one of the Four Virtues of classical antiquity. This word is used interchangeably (as regards the Four Cardinal Virtues) with ἀνδρεία. See Andreia.
Utilitarianism – Utilitarian ethics judges virtue from the perspective of utility; how does the action in question affect a result in regard to the well-being, happiness, and usefulness of sentient beings or nature as a whole. Utilitarianism attempts to seek the greatest good for the greatest number of people. These ideas were developed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who identified driving factors in utility as pleasure and pain. Benthams ideas were later expanded by another English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism.
Virtue Ethics – see Aretaic ethics.
Virtues, The Four Cardinal = The Four Cardinal Virtues are Courage (Ἀνδρεία), Temperance
(Σωφροσύνη), Justice (Δικαιοσύνη), and Wisdom (Σοφία and Φρόνησις).
Virtues, The Four Cardinal – see Virtues, The Four Cardinal.
Wisdom – see Phrónisis and Sophía.
Zetaretesiades – see Zitarætisiádis.
Zitarætisiádis (zetaretesiades; Gr. ζηταρετησιάδης, ΖΗΤΑΡΕΤΗΣΙΑΔΗΣ. Noun.) – one who tries to achieve virtue.